* docs(macos): document codesign side-effect popup ("微信" 想访问其他 App 的数据)
After `codesign --force --deep --sign - /Applications/WeChat.app`, macOS
treats the re-signed WeChat as a different code identity from the
original. When WeChat then accesses its own container / cache / app-group
data (notably triggered when opening 公众号 articles), macOS fires the
"'微信' 想访问其他 App 的数据" popup.
This is a known side-effect of the current macOS invasive init path,
not a "wx-cli is reading other apps' data" issue and not a 公众号-only
problem — 公众号 is just a high-frequency trigger surface because of
WebView / cache access.
Document this in 3 places per agreed scope:
- README.md macOS init: add "副作用提示" callout linking to the guide
- docs/macos-permission-guide.md: new §六 with first-principles
explanation, mitigation options, and long-term direction
- src/cli/init.rs: print a short macOS-only warning at the end of
`wx init` so users see it right when they finish the invasive setup
* review: stop overstating the trade-off and condition the init warning
Per codex review on PR #64:
1. src/cli/init.rs warning was unconditional but the wording presumed
the user had taken the ad-hoc re-sign path. If init goes through the
tier 2 path (Apple-signed WeChat + GUI Terminal + Developer Tools TCC
authorization), the warning would mis-fire. Reword conditionally and
point to the GitHub URL of the doc instead of a relative path that
release-binary / npm-installed users won't have on disk.
2. docs/macos-permission-guide.md §六 and the matching README callout
said "restoring official WeChat = giving up macOS memory-scan". This
contradicts the same guide's §一 实测表 which shows
"Apple 签名 + 本机 Terminal sudo = ✅". Restoring the official
signature only gives up the default re-sign path; the local-Terminal
+ Developer-Tools route still works on Apple-signed WeChat. Only
SSH + Apple-signed WeChat actually requires re-signing.
* review (round 2): caveat empirical gap + drop emoji
Self-review found two issues both LGTMs missed:
1. The "tier 2 仍走通" claim (README + §六) leans on §一 实测表 row
"Apple 签名 + 本机 Terminal sudo = ✅". But that data only covers
macOS 10.15 (Catalina) and 11.1 (Big Sur). macOS 14/15 — the exact
versions where the popup behavior originates — were never tested
for that path in this project. Add an explicit caveat instead of
silently extrapolating across major macOS versions.
2. `init.rs` warning used a ⚠️ emoji prefix, which violates the
project + global "no emojis in files unless requested" rule. README
and the rest of init.rs have no emoji. Replace with `[macOS]`.
The data-root ini under %APPDATA%\Tencent\xwechat\config\*.ini is
observed to contain either a plain absolute path (e.g. D:\WeChatFiles)
or the literal token 'MyDocument:'. The token form is not a real
filesystem path, so detect_db_dir_impl() — which previously did
PathBuf::from(content).is_dir() — silently failed on it, even though
the user's Weixin data was sitting in their (possibly relocated)
Documents folder.
Empirically the token denotes 'the calling user's Documents folder'.
We resolve it via SHGetKnownFolderPath(FOLDERID_Documents), which
honours the standard Windows shell-folder redirect (HKCU User Shell
Folders\Personal), so users who moved Documents to e.g. D:\Documents
now auto-detect correctly.
Plain absolute paths still pass through unchanged.
Adds Win32_UI_Shell + Win32_System_Com features to the windows crate
(needed for SHGetKnownFolderPath and CoTaskMemFree).
When auto_detect_db_dir() fails, the error told the user to edit
config.json without saying where that file lives. On Windows that is
%USERPROFILE%\.wx-cli\config.json, which is non-obvious.
Use the config_path already computed at the top of cmd_init() so the
error message includes the absolute path, plus a concrete example of
the db_dir shape.
Lays down the skeleton for聊天附件 (chat attachment) extraction. This commit
introduces the `attachment` module with:
- `attachment_id`: opaque base64url(json) round-trip handle for CLI/IPC. Carries
`(chat, local_id, create_time, kind)` — `local_id` alone is not unique
(实测同 chat 内最多 7 条同 local_id 的记录), so create_time is required for
disambiguation.
- `decoder/`: dispatch by 6B header magic. Three branches:
- `V2_MAGIC` → AES-128-ECB + raw + XOR (need image AES key)
- `V1_MAGIC` → AES-128-ECB with fixed key `cfcd208495d565ef` (= md5("0")[:16])
- else → legacy single-byte XOR with magic auto-detect
Manual ECB + PKCS7 unpad to avoid pulling in another crate.
- `resolver`: `message_resource.db` lookup chain
`username → ChatName2Id.rowid → MessageResourceInfo.packed_info → md5`
+ on-disk `.dat` selection (full > _h > _t) under
`<wxchat_base>/msg/attach/<md5(chat)>/<YYYY-MM>/Img/<md5>[_t|_h].dat`.
Honors `message_local_type % 2^32` to strip the high flag bits, and orders by
`message_create_time DESC` to handle local_id reuse.
- `image_key/`: stub trait + macOS / Windows placeholders. To be filled by
codex with the V2 image key extraction (kvcomm + brute-force on macOS, memory
scan on Windows).
V1 decoder ships with 6 unit tests covering every supported magic + the BMP
extra validation; resolver ships with packed_info parser + dat-file selection
tests; v2 decoder ships with header validation tests. 21 tests pass.
`cargo check` and `cargo check --target x86_64-pc-windows-gnu` both clean.
The 原理 section previously listed only macOS Mach VM API and Linux /proc/<pid>/mem,
omitting the Windows scanner path that has existed in src/scanner/windows.rs since
the Rust rewrite. Add the Windows API pair and the required process access rights
so the section accurately reflects all three platforms supported in CI/builds.
- daemon: write pid file only after IPC bound; clean sock+pid on normal return
- transport: PidFile JSON metadata + identity verification (ps/QueryFullProcessImageNameW); SIGTERM with poll-timeout; backward-compat read for plain-text pid
- daemon_cmd: status/stop work with both new JSON and legacy plain-text pid file
- config: cwd → exe_dir → ~/.wx-cli config precedence matches `wx init` write order; Windows DB auto-detect picks newest by latest mtime
- crypto: full_decrypt uses read_exact for intermediate pages, zero-pads only the final partial page; tests cover short-chunk reads and early EOF
- scanner/windows: page protect check covers PAGE_READWRITE / PAGE_WRITECOPY / PAGE_EXECUTE_*WRITE* with modifier-bit stripping
Cross-reviewed by @wx-cli-coder. Windows verified via `cargo check --target x86_64-pc-windows-gnu` (no Windows runtime test).
- q_contacts: replaced ad-hoc `gh_*`/`biz_*` prefix filter with
`chat_type_of == "private"`. The old filter leaked groups
(`@chatroom`), folded entries (`brandsessionholder` /
`@placeholder_foldgroup`), verified service accounts
(`verify_flag != 0`), and internal `@xxx` system accounts into
`wx contacts` output.
- q_search: parallelized the per-message-DB blocking phase via
`JoinSet::spawn_blocking`. Previously the `for (db_path, ...) in
by_path { ... .await }` loop ran one DB at a time; users with N
message_*.db shards paid N× latency. Each DB now runs concurrently
on the blocking pool; total latency collapses to a single slow DB.
- q_new_messages: fixed `new_state` reset path so first-run + truncated
sessions don't lock `since_ts` at `fallback_ts` forever. Old code
always wrote `state[uname] = old_since_ts || fallback_ts` for changed
sessions, then advanced only those that appeared in `all_msgs`. On
first run (state=None) truncated sessions ended up with
`state[uname] = now-86400` and stayed there across calls — every
subsequent call re-scanned a window that grew with elapsed time.
New logic separates three cases:
* in_results → advance to returned_max (incremental fetch)
* truncated + state → keep prev since_ts (retry next call)
* truncated + none → advance to session_ts (avoid lock-in; old
messages remain reachable via `wx history`).
macOS TCC binds permissions to (bundle id, csreq) where csreq encodes
the app's code signature. `codesign --force --deep --sign -` on
WeChat changes the csreq, silently invalidating every existing TCC
grant for com.tencent.xinWeChat — yet System Settings still paints
each toggle as ON because the UI only checks bundle id, hiding the
drift. WeChat then reprompts for screen recording / camera /
microphone / file access despite "looking allowed".
Three doc-only updates, no code changes:
- README.md quick start: add the `tccutil reset` loop right after the
codesign step, plus a one-line callout pointing at the deep-dive
section.
- SKILL.md macOS init flow: same loop in the agent-readable order, so
agents executing the steps don't skip it.
- docs/macos-permission-guide.md: new section 五 with first-principles
root cause, the reset loop, the macOS 26 "录屏与系统录音 / 仅系统
录音" UI split footgun, and ad-hoc signature verification.
Builds on the BobbyCat PR #29 — keeps the symptom description and the
macOS 26 UI split note, expands scope from ScreenCapture-only to all
TCC services that re-signing actually breaks (Camera / Microphone /
AppleEvents / AddressBook / Documents / Downloads / Desktop), drops
the misleading TCC.db sqlite query (path varies by macOS version, can
need FDA, and is no more useful than just trying WeChat's screenshot
again), and explicitly leaves the reset as a manual step rather than
auto-running it from `wx init` because it would wipe currently-working
grants.
Co-authored-by: BobbyCat <114374951+BobbyCats@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat: expose url field for link/appmsg messages
Extract <url> from appmsg XML in type-49 messages and append it as
a 'url' field in history/search output. The field is omitted when
the message has no valid URL (non-link types, empty, non-http).
* fix: normalize appmsg urls across query outputs
---------
Co-authored-by: tsinghu <tsinghu@tencent.com>
Co-authored-by: jackwener <jakevingoo@gmail.com>
* feat: support group nicknames
* fix(group): keep duplicate nickname senders separate in stats
---------
Co-authored-by: jackwener <jakevingoo@gmail.com>
Clarify that the 500-message behavior is only a default limit, not a hard cap.
Document `-n/--limit` examples for history, search, and export in both README and SKILL.
Was: Arc<std::sync::RwLock<Names>>; each dispatch clone_names() copied
4 HashMaps (~100KB for a user with 2700 contacts) and used std RwLock
which blocks the tokio worker thread during the clone.
Now: Arc<tokio::sync::RwLock<Arc<Names>>>; dispatch takes the read
guard, does Arc::clone (pointer bump), drops the guard, then spawns
the query work. Names is immutable after daemon startup; Arc is ideal.
Smoke tested: `wx sessions --json` returns correct data including
chat_type; 8 concurrent clients finish in 12ms.
Root cause: `wx init` does two conceptually-separate things in one
privileged process: (1) scan WeChat memory for keys (needs root) and
(2) write ~/.wx-cli/{all_keys,config}.json (needs only user). When
run under sudo, the files inherit root ownership, so later the daemon
(forked as the user) can't create daemon.sock/log/pid → silent 15s
timeout.
Also: all_keys.json is the raw AES key; 0644 leaked it to every user
on the system.
Fix in init.rs: after the scan completes, immediately setgid+setuid
back to \$SUDO_UID/\$SUDO_GID and set umask 0o077 before any file I/O.
Files are then created as the real user with 0600 by default. Migrate
old broken installs by chown+chmod-recursive before the setuid call.
Fix in transport.rs: pre-check that ~/.wx-cli/ is writable before
spawning daemon; on EACCES print a clear "sudo chown -R ..." hint
instead of the useless "daemon 启动超时" message.
jakevin
suda
kael
Icy-Cat
陈源泉
Haoqing Wang
Tsing
刘传佳
郭立lee
JL